From Tariffs to Opportunity: U.S.–Greece Economic Cooperation in a Volatile World

By Tatiana Goudas

 

The United States and the European Union have reached an agreement on a transatlantic trade deal that increases tariffs for exports of European goods to the United States to 15%, a welcome sign as uncertainty was starting to weigh on the economy. As business leaders are seeking further clarity and explore potential alternatives to the existing transatlantic trade corridors, the aim of this analysis is to provide some perspective on the framework underpinning U.S.-Greece trade and investment and identify opportunities amid an unstable international landscape. Irrespective of remaining uncertainties and the twists and turns of the transatlantic trade negotiations, this essay identifies areas where aligned strategic interests create business opportunities and illustrates how U.S.-Greece economic ties can flourish even amid heightened volatility and shifting rules of trade. Beginning with a timeline of recent policy escalations from the symbolic “Liberation Day” and zooming in on the U.S.-EU exchange of tariffs, countermeasures, and negotiations, it maps the key points of transatlantic trade tensions and bilateral economic ties in strategic sectors to identify opportunities amid a shifting trade environment.

 

On Tariffs and Trade Disputes

The first significant escalation in transatlantic trade tensions occurred on March 12th, 2025, when the U.S. announced a revised tariff schedule raising import duties on steel and aluminum to 25% (and later to 50%), including all derivative products in the category, finished goods and subcomponents, all applied globally without any exemption for the EU, with the White House citing national security concerns.

While tariffs are often seen as disruptive, especially by export-dependent economies, their use reflects deeper policy objectives. From national security and supply chain resilience to job preservation and political accountability, tariffs can be part of a broader strategy. The key challenge – and opportunity – lies in identifying sectors and partnerships where such measures can serve as a catalyst for rebalancing trade, stimulating investment, and deepening bilateral cooperation. From the U.S. administration’s standpoint, these duties on imports were imposed on national security grounds, they were expected to be a source of government revenue, eventually narrowing the country’s trade deficit. However, while the administration emphasizes national security and reshoring benefits, some analysts have raised questions. The Governor of the Bank of Greece, Yannis Stournaras, notes that “tariffs are never the best policy,” a view shared by many economists. e. In the same spirit, the Director of the Peterson Institute of International Economics Adam Posen warned, at the Spotlight Forum of the Senate Committee on Finance, that“it’s a very inefficient way to generate revenue” noting that the consensus among economic analysts is that the proposed tariff schedule would generate government revenue “on the order of 1.5 percent of GDP a year” which is a very low return considering the implications of a trade war on global partnerships.

Another justification for the administration’s imposition of sweeping tariffs is the goal of accelerating the reshoring of American manufacturing. As emphasized by the White House on “Liberation Day,” reprioritizing U.S. manufacturing is essential to both national security and enhancing the country’s global competitiveness. The theoretical basis for this argument lies in the classic protectionist view that higher import duties can shield domestic industries from foreign competition, thereby encouraging localized production and boosting domestic revenue. However, historical examples such as the Soviet Union illustrate the long-term risks of inward-looking economic models. The Soviet focus on self-sufficiency and import substitution ultimately led to systemic inefficiencies, technological stagnation, and widespread shortages—factors that contributed significantly to its economic decline. In the post–Cold War era, protectionist policies are even more costly and, in many cases, unachievable due to the complexity of global supply chains. Miranda Xafa, former IMF Executive Director for Greece, points out that “Trump considers trade to be a zero-sum game, with winners and losers but in reality, it never is. This administration targets imports in an effort to “protect” the import competing firms. However, the U.S. labor force cannot sustain a repatriation of massive production plants,” such as those that would be required to produce the iPhone in the U.S. To help the goal of reshoring, the agreement with the EU includes a promise to increase investment by European firms in the U.S. by $600 bn.

While the economic benefits of the U.S. administration’s trade policy remain subject to debate among analysts and policy practitioners, its broader impact on global trade dynamics has been widely noted, prompting both adjustments and responses from key international partners.. When a diverse and dynamic market as is that of the United States raises import duties to significant levels, its trading partners may retaliate to protect their businesses, maintain their levels of economic activity, and avoid sudden slowdowns in growth. In April, Brussels struck back with retaliatory tariffs targeting emblematic U.S goods such as bourbon, motorcycles, jeans, and washing machines, with rates ranging from 10% to 50%. A second wave soon followed, covering textiles, dairy, nuts, and wood products – ultimately capturing roughly $26 billion worth of U.S. imports to the EU. In response, the Trump administration raised the stakes by announcing a 10% across-the-board tariff on all products imported from the EU to the United States, a figure that climbed with each subsequent announcement, culminating in an unprecedented threat: a 50% blanket tariff on all EU goods, meant to force Brussels to a comprehensive EU–U.S. trade agreement. Meanwhile, citing national security concerns under the Section 232 authority, the U.S. administration was also considering extending punitive tariffs to EU commercial aircraft and even pharmaceutical imports, which may still be taxed with higher tariffs. Despite such frictions, the very scale of U.S.–EU trade underscores the enduring interdependence of the two economies and the potential for Greece to position itself as a stable partner within this broader framework.

The negotiation of multiple trade agreements between the U.S. and its major trading partners signals a tidal change in the global trade order as it will not only set the new “terms of trade” with the U.S. but eventually redefine economic partnerships and alliances. Miranda Xafa explains that the “level playing field” is shifting, suggesting that trade relations will no longer be governed by multilateral, rules-based systems (e.g., WTO). Instead, the global trade equilibriums will be dictated by bilateralism and mutually beneficial partnerships. However, there is yet no clear or coherent architecture of international trade alliances. The USMCA early review talks, initially seen as an opportunity to modernize the agreement, have instead exposed deep divisions, with Mexico resisting sweeping changes or concessions to U.S. demands and Canada seeking closer trade relations with the EU. As with the agreement with the EU, the U.S.–UK deal, while marketed as a breakthrough, leaves critical barriers—such as the Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs—largely in place, underscoring a transactional approach rather than a comprehensive alignment. The scattered nature of these agreements, often limited to sector-specific concessions and accompanied by lingering tariffs and regulatory disputes, also raises some questions about the durability and depth of the U.S.-EU deal.

Meanwhile across the Pacific, even a likely extension of the U.S.–China “trade truce” lacks the clarity and structure of a durable trade deal with both sides maintaining a posture of strategic competition rather than partnership. What is more, this fragile truce comes at a time when Beijing is strategically redirecting its own production. With U.S. tariffs now sharply limiting Chinese exports, concerns are growing in Brussels that Europe may become a dumping ground for redirected overcapacity—particularly in electric vehicles, solar panels, and steel. The risk of the “EU becoming a pressure valve of U.S. – China warfare,” as aptly described by the Financial Times, further complicates trade negotiations for the EU. A weak U.S.-China deal could shift trade tensions westward – forcing Europe to protect its industry while Washington and Beijing recalibrate. In effect, their tenuous Geneva pact not only fails to stabilize global trade—it actively raises the geopolitical stakes for Europe, turning the transatlantic negotiating table into a three-way strategic arena. Indeed, while the bloc remains committed to transatlantic cooperation, this moment marks an inflection point in EU’s trade policy as it is also accelerating efforts to reach parallel trade deals with countries such as Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia with the objective of strengthening ties with South-East Asia.

 

This fragmented approach to trade negotiations also casts a shadow over the U.S.-EU trade deal, where hopes for a return to stability are tempered by the realities of an unsettled global economic landscape. Dan Mullaney, former Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Europe and the Middle East (2010–2023) had low expectations, warning that we should not expect “a detailed binding deal where all the t’s are crossed and the i’s are dotted,” lacking the “clarity and specificity necessary for implementation.” His assessment captures the current reality of the deal  between Brussels and Washington, as after months of negotiations and deadlines crossed, the U.S.-EU agreement follows the UK model of higher across the board tariffs, with the contested transatlantic issues such as the digital tax left untouched, and the U.S. threat of higher sectoral tariffs still hanging over Europe.

On the EU side, the President of the European Commission, Ursula Von der Leyen had set the EU primary goal to keeping tariffs “as low as possible”. At 15%, the US-EU agreement has achieved that goal, and importantly, also contributes to maintaining an open dialogue between the transatlantic partners.  It also helps avoid further trade tensions, as the threatened 30%  import duties had prompted Europeans to prepare countermeasures and devise contingency plans not only to protect European industries but to declare Europe’s economic posture. According to a Bloomberg report, Brussels has prepared a two-tiered retaliation strategy targeting approximately €21 billion worth of U.S. goods, and a broader package potentially targeting up to €116 billion, including Boeing aircrafts, American-made automobiles, and bourbon.

Avoiding such an escalation ultimately helps protect the transatlantic economy, which would be very costly to decouple. On one hand, structural interdependence between the U.S. and EU member states is well anchored in a broad range of sectors such as energy, defense equipment and pharmaceuticals. On the other hand, decoupling would require the disentanglement of meticulously monitored global supply chains, a lengthy and cumbersome process that transcends the politics of any single administration. This view, shared by many economic analysts and trade policy practitioners on both sides of the Atlantic, forebodes both some optimism and “wiggle space”. In other words, while higher tariffs present risks for small and medium economies like Greece, , they may also create space for niche business opportunities and new partnerships in strategic sectors of the economy.

In this fluid environment, companies should adjust to a period of increased uncertainty and remain engaged, adaptive, and alert to sector-specific developments, while resisting the urge to make reactive decisions based on each day’s headlines. Stan Veuger, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), warns that what may appear to be a coherent policy process is often a façade, masking ideological fragmentation and institutional disarray. He thinks that policy clarity in the transatlantic trade landscape is unlikely in the near future, implying that President Trump’s trade rhetoric should be viewed less as definitive policy and more as a series of political signals. Hence, businesses should adopt a long-term, sector-specific monitoring approach – distilling actual policies from noise rather than reshaping strategy around each new presidential post on Truth Social.

 

Greece – U.S. Economic Ties: A strategic partnership

Against the backdrop of high-profile trade negotiations, it helps to focus on the regulatory frameworks and strategic bilateral agreements underpinning Greece-US economic ties. These mechanisms not only define the current trade environment but also set the trajectory for future cooperation between the two countries. This analysis places particular emphasis on sectors that have historically formed the backbone of U.S.-Greece trade: defense and military equipment, and more lately energy, which have functioned as strategic pillars of mutual security and regional stability; alongside steel and aluminum, all sectors that are now deeply entangled in the complexities of the transatlantic negotiations and global supply chain realignments.

 

Defense & Military Equipment Though EU-U.S. negotiations set the stage for transatlantic trade relations, it is key to understand that even though the EU is treated as a trade bloc its very nature renders its trade policy far more nuanced. For instance, Defense and Military equipment are excluded from EU competence under Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), which allows national governments to make independent decisions on defense contracts and military imports.

 

Perched at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, Greece serves as a critical gateway to the Eastern Mediterranean and Southeast Europe. The ongoing war in Ukraine has intensified the focus on Europe’s eastern border and the strategic importance of its southern periphery, deepening concerns over energy security, hybrid threats, and military readiness. At the same time, Greece continues to navigate long-standing tensions with neighboring Türkiye over airspace, maritime boundaries, and territorial rights in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean. These pressures—both traditional and emerging—have reinforced Athens’ commitment to bolstering its national defense, reflected in a sustained increase in military spending and expanded cooperation with key NATO partners.

 

In 2021, Greece’s defense budget surged to 3.86% of GDP and while easing slightly to around 3.23% in 2023, remained among the highest within NATO. In 2024, the country continued this trend, spending over 3% of its GDP on defense and military equipment. In April of 2025, the Greek Prime Minister announced a €25 billion, 12-year defense modernization plan, describing it in Parliament as “the most drastic transformation in the history of the country’s armed forces.”

This ambitious initiative signals Greece’s continued commitment to enhancing its deterrence capability and aligns with NATO’s renewed focus on strengthening allied defense postures. At the June 2025 summit in The Hague, NATO members agreed to increase defense-related outlays to 5 percent of GDP by 2035, with 3.5 percent earmarked for core military capability and 1.5 percent for broader resilience measures—offering Greece not only strategic validation but also political space to maintain, and potentially increase, its robust defense investments. For U.S. firms, this translates into expanded opportunities for joint projects, co-production, and long-term collaboration with Greek defense companies.

 

Greece’s defense deepening not only aligns with NATO’s more resolute posture but also enjoys growing support from the EU, which has been pivoting toward a more integrated defense policy in response to global security concerns. At the March 2025 European summit, the Greek Prime Minister backed a proposed “escape clause” to allow member states to increase defense spending beyond fiscal constraints—an approach officially welcomed by Commission President von der Leyen. In concert, the EU has launched successive rounds of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) projects, now numbering over 75, aimed at shared capability development—ranging from cyber and intelligence training to autonomous naval systems certifications. Complementing this initiative, the European Defense Fund (EDF) continues to financially support R&D and capability-building across member states, providing Greek firms with co‑financing opportunities for modernization-related projects.

 

Against this backdrop, Greece is strengthening its strategic alignment with the United States—an alliance institutionalized through the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA), originally signed in 1990, and significantly updated in 2019 and 2021. The MDCA allows for critical U.S. military presence at strategic locations such as Alexandroupolis, Larissa, Stefanovikio, and the Souda Bay naval base in Crete, facilities that serve as key logistical hubs and staging grounds for NATO operations, reaffirming Greece’s role as a reliable security actor on NATO’s southeastern flank.

 

The operational and logistical value of these bases is matched by an expanding portfolio of U.S.-Greece defense cooperation. Since 2016, Greece has received over $282 million in U.S. military equipment. More significantly, the United States is currently managing more than $11 billion in Foreign Military Sales programs with Greece. These include major upgrades to Greece’s F-16 fighters to the “Viper” configuration, the acquisition of MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, and modernization of its S-70B naval helicopter fleet. During the fifth U.S.–Greece Strategic Dialogue held in 2024, the two countries reiterated their commitment to deepen collaboration in areas such as infrastructure development, advanced procurement, and expanded joint training programs.

 

Greece’s strategic alignment with the United States opens a critical window for domestic defense companies and startups to elevate their technological capabilities and global competitiveness. U.S.-origin systems—interoperable with NATO standards and adapted to the Eastern Mediterranean’s operational realities—offer both technical compatibility and economic opportunity. According to market insights collected by the International Trade Administration (ITA), three core areas stand out for joint engagement: co-development of advanced systems such as Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), Counter-UAS (C-UAS), and AI-enhanced Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD); the supply and co-manufacture of specialized components and platforms; and long-term collaboration in training, integration, and sustainment.

 

As Greece pushes forward with its defense modernization agenda amid a broader digital transformation, the government’s interest in strengthening its domestic defense ecosystem further incentivizes joint ventures and R&D cooperation. For Greek firms, this focus offers a pathway to become embedded in high-value transatlantic supply chains and innovation networks, with mutual benefits for both sides of the partnership.

 

Energy

The U.S.-EU trade agreement, which includes significant EU commitments to import U.S. gas, underlines how energy trade has emerged as a focal point for transatlantic economic ties that also reflects EU national security priorities. The reshaping of global energy flows—driven by the war in Ukraine, U.S.-China tensions, and shifting climate policies—has elevated LNG, hydrogen, and critical minerals as central components of the new trade frameworks.

 

Faced with the grim reality that dependency on Kremlin‑controlled pipelines could allow Moscow to choke European economies—or worse, weaponize energy supply—the European Commission unveiled REPowerEU in May 2022. Greece responded by embedding a dedicated REPowerEU chapter into its Recovery and Resilience Plan in December 2023, unlocking roughly €18 billion across grid upgrades, energy storage, LNG infrastructure, and renewables. Revythoussa terminal was upgraded to handle some 30–40 percent of national demand in Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) and throughout 2024 it received 27 LNG tankers, 19 originating from U.S. terminals. In October 2024, Greece added a second major node, the Alexandroupolis Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU), which immediately became a linchpin of regional energy security. Venture Global, a Virginia-based energy company, focused on the development and operation of low-cost liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facilities, secured 1 Mtpa there under a five-year contract, lauded by analysts as “a game changer for the region’s ability to diversify”. Its CEO, Mike Sabel, described Alexandroupolis as “a key entry point for LNG into Central and Eastern Europe.”

 

These dual facilities now have the capacity to satisfy around half of Greece’s gas consumption and serve as a conduit sending American gas through the Greece–Bulgaria Interconnector and the expanding Trans–Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). This new reality translates not only to domestic resilience, but the formation of a transmission axis feeding Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania, and North Macedonia. Even Kyiv received its first U.S. cargo in late 2024 via Greece, with Ukraine’s DTEK CEO praising the move as further eroding “Russia’s influence over our energy system.” This illustrates how U.S. energy exports not only strengthen European security but also create lasting commercial partnerships with Greek infrastructure and shipping sectors.

 

Alexandroupolis can be viewed as a transformative project that has changed the energy security landscape in the Western Balkans, highlighting the important role of Greece for the region and making possible the Vertical Corridor that stretches from Greece through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia and Ukraine.

 

This strategic shift extends beyond LNG terminals and pipelines. Greece has attracted Chevron’s interest in two offshore exploration blocks off Crete and the Peloponnese—the second of which expanded its offshore rights to approximately 47,000 km² in March 2025, a project that would supplement imported gas with indigenous production. 

So, it is no coincidence that in his most recent call with the Greek Prime Minister, the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio discussed “the strategic importance of U.S.-Greece energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean.”

For businesses, Greece’s transformation offers a treasure trove of opportunities. LNG exporters and maritime shipping lines can establish long-term footholds at Revythoussa and Alexandroupolis. Engineering and construction firms specializing in FSRU deployment, pipeline upgrades, and smart-grid infrastructure are well-positioned for EU-backed contracts. In the upstream domain, U.S. service providers—drilling firms, seismic contractors, environmental consultants—stand ready to support Chevron’s offshore ventures. Clean-tech and energy-storage firms may partner on Greek offshore wind, hydrogen, and storage projects. Meanwhile, LNG bunkering, port modernization and digital‑logistics outfits can find rich pickings in redeveloping regional Greek ports such as Alexandroupolis, Kavala, and Elefsina.

 

Steel & Aluminum

 

Historically, targeted tariffs have been used to encourage the development of strategic sectors or protect industries undergoing transformation. For example, tariffs on imported steel have supported capacity utilization in U.S. mills, which some argue is essential for maintaining national defense readiness. In the case of aluminum, supply chain vulnerabilities highlighted during the pandemic have revived interest in localized production for medical, automotive, and aerospace applications.

 

Aluminum and steel are central to the high-stakes U.S. trade talks with Mexico and Canada, and the EU. On June 4, 2025, President Trump doubled Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from 25 % to 50 %, dramatically raising costs for Canada and Mexico, both of which export large volumes into the U.S. Yet as Goldman Sachs notes, roughly 25% of U.S. steel and 50% of its aluminum remain imported mostly from Canada and Mexico, highlighting that despite domestic reshoring rhetoric, the U.S. continues to rely heavily on foreign intermediary inputs.

 

Raising tariffs on steel and aluminum products is expected not only to slow down imports from coming in, but to also raise domestic prices of intermediary goods, forcing U.S. manufacturers to limit production and raise prices of finished goods. This irony underscores the U.S. economy’s structural exposure: while tariffs aim to boost local production, they also spike material costs, compelling American firms to diversify in order to ensure supply-chain continuity. Professor Nikos Vettas, Director General of IOBE notes that while current changes in trade flows are not permanent, we are witnessing temporary surges in U.S. imports as firms stockpile intermediate goods in anticipation of future tariffs and reconfigurations of global supply chains.

 

In 2024, Greece exported approximately $147.5 million in aluminum, 5.2% of total EU aluminum exports to the U.S and $27.4 million in iron and steel products to the United States. These exports included a range of intermediate and semi-finished products such as aluminum plates, bars, foil, tubes, and scrap, as well as rolled or forged iron and steel articles. Greece’s major exporters in these sectors, such ElvalHalcor, Viohalco, and Sidenor have built specialized capabilities in high-quality intermediary goods that feed directly into U.S. industrial processes.

 

Aluminum products from Greece are primarily used in sectors such as automotive manufacturing, construction (e.g., window frames, facades), packaging (e.g., foil and containers), and aerospace components. The use of some of these goods merits special attention in trade negotiations to avoid tariffs inflating input costs or disrupting supply chains, especially as Greek exports are positioned as a reliable source of essential industrial inputs and increasing the visibility of Greece as a strategic trade partner. By integrating into U.S. production chains, Greek exporters can help advance the Administration’s goals of reliable sourcing while ensuring continuity for American manufacturers.

 

Investment

Greece: A safe haven for targeted U.S. investment

Contrary to armed conflict, in the economic realm, no war can be regional. In other words, trade wars do not occur in a vacuum, and it is not long before even the greatest economy faces the far-reached implications of a trade conflict. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve Jerome Powell has warned of the implications of tariffs on U.S. consumer prices, even as the latest trade agreements lower the risks of a U.S. recession. Yet as the Governor of the Bank of Greece Yannis Stournaras puts it, “the U.S. economy could be witnessing a snowball effect.” As Stournaras explains, “the threat of tariffs with all major trading partners is dragging down macroeconomic aggregates, creating a slowdown in growth coupled with a rise in debt.” A trajectory that the Governor describes as “unsustainable.” He proceeds to explain that in this kind of environment, most investors tend to move “toward safer, more stable investments in jurisdictions where macroeconomic fundamentals are showing improvement.”

Amid global economic uncertainty, Greece has emerged as a surprising, yet compelling, outlier, demonstrating that structural reform, fiscal responsibility, and strategic investment can drive not just recovery, but sustained momentum. According to the Bank of Greece’s (BoG) June 2025 report, the country’s GDP grew by 2.2% in the first quarter of 2025, significantly outpacing the euro area average of 1.5%. This growth is not merely cyclical or consumption-driven; rather, it is underpinned by a confluence of factors that reaffirm the country’s emerging role as a resilient, reform-driven economy within a volatile global order.

The drivers of this expansion are both broad-based and deeply structural. As stated in the BoG report, Private consumption remains robust, exports of goods have held steady, and the labor market has shown considerable resilience. Credit growth to businesses surged by over 17% year-on-year in April 2025 — a notable indicator of private sector confidence. Meanwhile, the public debt-to-GDP ratio fell by more than ten percentage points in 2024 alone, marking the sharpest decline among EU member states. This is a critical milestone for a country that only a decade ago was grappling with the fallout of a sovereign debt crisis.

These developments acquire even greater significance when viewed through the lens of global macroeconomic trends. As Professor Nikos Vettas, Director General of the Foundation for Economic, and Industrial Research (IOBE), argues, the world economy is currently in a “wait-and-see” phase. Policymakers and investors alike face persistent ambiguity regarding the direction of global trade, the stickiness of inflation, and the future trajectory of monetary policy in both advanced and emerging economies. Crucially, no systemic reorganization of global trade has yet taken hold, making it difficult to assess long-term implications for production networks and capital flows. In such an environment, where risk aversion dominates and predictability is scarce, Greece’s diversified recovery illustrates its growing potential to absorb high quality and targeted investment.

Sectoral performance further reinforces this argument. In the first quarter of 2025, foreign direct investment (FDI) flowed primarily into manufacturing, construction, and real estate, sectors with strong multiplier effects and export potential. In real estate specifically, apartment prices rose by 6.8% year-on-year, with notable accelerations in key urban centers like Thessaloniki (10%) and Athens (5.5%). Commercial real estate followed suit, with prime office and retail prices increasing by 6.2% and 9.2%, respectively. The tourism sector, long a pillar of the Greek economy, has also shown impressive performance, with arrivals up by 5.8% and revenues climbing 10.6% in the first four months of 2025. Together, these indicators suggest not only rising investor interest but also the successful conversion of capital into real economic activity, particularly in services, logistics, and high-value urban infrastructure.

Importantly, the quality of investment inflows is evolving. Greece is no longer simply absorbing capital; it is directing it strategically. As Professor Vettas emphasizes, the focus is shifting toward innovation-led, productivity-enhancing investment that supports long-term competitiveness. Backed by the European Union’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), Greece is channeling substantial resources into investments that are not only aligned with EU priorities but are structured to improve long-run supply-side capacity, rather than simply fueling short-term demand. This transition is perhaps best encapsulated by Greece’s new “national innovation strategy,” unveiled by Deputy Prime Minister Kostis Hatzidakis during a recent event co-organized by the Bank of Greece and the European Investment Bank. The strategy’s five pillars, designed to address persistent structural issues that have long hindered corporate dynamism in Southern Europe, focus on creating tax incentives such as tax deduction for R&D spending, tax relief for companies commercializing patents, and generous breaks for angel investors supporting Greek startups. These policies aim to correct the chronic “small scale and high risk” syndrome, as Hatzidakis described it, by fostering scale-up potential, encouraging innovation, and reducing investment barriers for growth-stage firms.

In conclusion, Greece’s economic trajectory signals a deliberate repositioning of the country as a strategic, stable, and reform-oriented economy that is actively shaping its future rather than reacting to external shocks, that stands out as a niche destination for targeted investment.

U.S.: A premium destination for Greek investment

At the 2025 SelectUSA Investment Summit, held in May, Kevin Hassett, former Chair of the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers, painted a rather bullish picture of America’s economic trajectory, stating “There is no better time than now to invest in America.” Hassett buoyantly described a “Golden Age Boom” defined by deregulation, a business-friendly tax climate and a promised AI-driven revolution in productivity. Indeed, America remains an attractive market with $7–10 trillion in total foreign direct investment (FDI) stock, and individual states offering tailored incentives across sectors from clean energy to advanced manufacturing, according to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.This environment, despite policy shifts, continues to make the U.S. one of the world’s most attractive and dynamic destinations for Greek capital.

However, this broader appeal is tempered by continued policy uncertainty. While Section 899 – which previously threatened to penalize foreign investments through anti-inversion provisions—was removed from the so-called “One Big Beautiful Bill” earlier this month, it revealed how easily investment conditions in the U.S. can be altered by political currents. Its withdrawal has brought relief, but not certainty.

Against these challenges, Xafa suggests investing in the “real economy” — productive sectors like energy, transportation, logistics, and manufacturing, rather than speculative financial vehicles. For Greek investors, this means prioritizing brick-and-mortar investments in the U.S. that can weather policy volatility and dollar fluctuations. One particularly promising channel for Greek investment is the shipping and maritime industry. With more than 30 Greek-owned shipping companies listed in the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ indices, there is already significant investment in the sector. Still, a series of recent U.S. policy initiatives indicate an effort to also attract foreign direct investment in maritime infrastructure and capacity building. The April 9th Executive Order titled Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance includes the creation of a Maritime Action Plan to modernize port infrastructure, provide mariner training, and offer regulatory and financial incentives to attract private investment in ports and shipyards. The executive order also directs the establishment of Maritime Prosperity Zones to incentivize and facilitate domestic and allied investment in U.S. maritime industries and waterfront communities. The Shipbuilding and Harbor Infrastructure for Prosperity and Security (SHIPS) for America Act, reintroduced later the same month with bipartisan support, includes provisions to revitalize domestic shipbuilding, modernize port infrastructure, and support workforce development, further demonstrating a concerted effort to attract foreign direct investment in maritime infrastructure and capacity.

This federal level initiative clearly signals the efforts of the U.S. to attract investment in the industry however the regulatory environment remains complex. U.S. cabotage laws, customs regimes, and environmental compliance—particularly under the Jones Act—continue to pose challenges, especially for firms without established local partnerships. Most notably, state-level asymmetric policies underscore the importance of strategic localization. For example, while jurisdictions like Texas and Georgia promote maritime infrastructure through expedited permitting and fiscal incentives, others such as California uphold stricter emissions and labor standards.

However, Greece’s merchant fleet has demonstrated a modest pivot toward U.S.-based maritime infrastructure, especially ports, logistics hubs, and ship servicing ecosystems suggesting that these barriers are certainly not insurmountable. In 2024, delegations from the Greek Shipping Co-operation Committee (GSCC) and the Union of Greek Shipowners held meetings with port authorities in Savannah, Houston, and Norfolk, exploring opportunities in green retrofitting and intermodal freight expansion. These visits reflect a clear willingness to explore opportunities. If managed carefully, such ventures could place Greek firms in a strong position to contribute to and benefit from the reconfiguration of U.S. logistics and trade corridors.

In sum, the United States represents a compelling destination for Greek investment, but caution must define investor strategy as the policy environment remains fluid, the dollar is volatile, and future legislation could introduce novel uncertainties, especially if the trade war reignites. Still, with informed planning, sectoral focus, and careful partner selection, Greek investors can capitalize on U.S. opportunities—especially in real assets tied to logistics, transport, and energy—without exposing themselves to undue risk.

 

Cautious Optimism

In today’s fragmented trade environment, “it is simply too early,” as Professor Nikos Vettas underlined, to draw any conclusions as to the precise contours of the emerging global trade order. While the EU-U.S. trade agreement avoids the worst-case scenario of across-the-board 30% tariffs, there is little clarity as to what the “impulses on behalf of the current administration,” to use Stan Veuger’s choice of words, may mean for world trade in the future. However, uncertainty does not mean that businesses should stay put. The volatility of Trump-era trade dynamics should be seen less as prescriptive policy and more as political signaling. Amid policy ambiguity and shifting alliances, the smart strategy lies not in inertia, but in calibrated engagement—identifying sector-specific risks and opportunities, monitoring institutional signals, and investing in long-term resilience.

As the global system moves away from multilateralism toward bilateralism and strategic realignment, countries like Greece can leverage their competitive advantages and strategic relationship with the U.S. and demonstrate agility in the face of transatlantic trade tensions to secure the benefits of a deeper bilateral economic partnership, from defense and energy to key commodities and new technologies.